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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

THE PORT DISTRICT: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
OF AN IMPORTANT TYPE OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, WITH EMPHASIS ON
ILLINOIS DISTRICTS
NATURE OF A PORT DISTRICT

A port district is a political subdivision which is neither a county, a
city nor a town.' This descriptively indefinite statement serves to distinguish the subject matter of this comment from various governmental units
whose territorial jurisdiction sometimes coincide with or overlap that of
a port district. Investigation reveals that a more definitive statement is
difficult.
In an effort to improve natural facilities for water commerce, state
legislatures have created instrumentalities to deal with the special problems
of port development. Whatever, the name-be it "port,"' "port authority,"
"port district," "harbor commission," or some such term-the powers and
the duties of such instrumentality are expressly set out in statutory enactment fulfilling the objectives of a particular state legislature. 2 A crosscountry tabulation of powers and duties is clearly impossible in a comment such as this.
This is not to indicate that port authorities are found solely in this
country. The Port of London, for example, was created to accomplish
the same general ends as American port districts, i.e., administration, improvement, registration and licensing. Like its American counterparts, it
derives its authority from legislation (Act of Parliament) plus ownership.
of the land and water with which it must deal (part of the Thames River).a
HELD TO BE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

As stated above, port districts are products of special legislative action.
In many states, municipal corporations are the only kind which can be
established by special law. Around the turn of the century, therefore,
courts found that a classification of port districts was necessary in order
to determine the validity of legislative action incorporating special bodies
to regulate the use of and improve the facilities of harbor areas.
Thus, in 1891, the Oregon Supreme Court analyzed the term "municipal
corporation" and found it designates a "public corporation," one which
exercises some of the functions of government, i.e., one established for
I Straw v. Harris, 54 Ore. 333, 103 P. 777 (1909).
2 E.g., N.Y. Consolidated Laws Ann. (McKinney, 1957) c. 65, S§ 6401 to 6700; 111.

Rev. Star. (1957) c. 17, §§ 152 to 178; Rev. Code of Wash. (1952) c. 91, S91.04.010 et seq.
3 For a brief, well-written analysis of this Port, consult: Perkins, The Port of London
Authority, Municipal Law Service Letter, Vol. 7, No. 9, pp. 4 to 8 (November 1957).
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"municipal purposes." Maintenance of a ship canal, reasoned the court,
is such a "municipal purpose." The Port of Portland was, therefore, a
municipal corporation, validly created as such and rightly given the power
to borrow money and levy taxes in furtherance of its purposes.4 Paine v.
Port of Seattle5 presents a rationale based on the Washington Constitution
for the establishment of what was at that time a new type of municipal
corporation. Section 6, Article 8 of this constitution had established limitations of indebtedness applicable to counties, cities, towns, school districts
and "other municipal corporations." Thus, the right to establish "other
municipal corporations" was inferred.
Certain states have strict constitutional prohibitions against the establishment of any corporation through special act. Because of such prohibition, the classification as a municipal corporation has in some instances
prevented the establishment of port agencies in such states.6 However,
courts have been known to interpret the strict wording to apply only to
7
private or business corporations.
Probably the most recent case on this type of municipal corporation
concerns the Port Authority of Duluth.8 In 1957, the Minnesota Legislature had adopted three acts, providing for, among other things, financial
aid from the state, county and City of Duluth to enable the Port Authority
to carry out necessary functions, i.e., to reclaim land and construct terminal
port facilities. Plaintiff taxpayer claimed three provisions of the Minnesota
Constitution were violated: Article 4, Section 33 and Article 9, Section 1,
both prohibiting taxation for private purposes, and Article 10, Section 2
forbidding the formation of corporations other than those for municipal
purposes. It was contended that government aid was unnecessary as the
Port had, up to that time, been extensively developed through the efforts
of private industry.
Justice Knutson of the Minnesota Supreme Court, in the Duluth case,
gives an excellent historical treatment of port supervision as a governmental function. Essentially a prerogative of the sovereignty in many
parts of the Old World,9 the establishment and maintenance of ports is
shown to be considered in America, "a project of [distinctive] public
interest and purpose...-lo so as to render the supervisory body "an arm
4Cook v. Port of Portland, 20 Ore. 580,27 P. 263 (1891).
5
70 Wash. 294, 126 P. 628 (1912).
oRosencranz v. Evansville, 194 Ind. 479, 143 N.E. 593 (1924); Farrell v. Port of Columbia, 50 Ore. 169,91 P. 546 (1907).
7Webb v. Port Commission of Morehead City, 205 N.C. 663,172 S.E. 377 (1934).
8Visina v. Freeman, 252 Minn. 177, 89 N.W. 2d 635 (1958).
9Internal Revenue v. Ten Eyck, 76 F2d 515 (CA. 2d, 1935).
10 Marchant v. Baltimore, 146 Md. 513, 521, 126 A. 884, 887 (1924).
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and agent of"" the state government. The benefit to a principal harbor
of a state is sufficiently "public" so that lands taken for that purpose are
taken for a public use. 12 The Minnesota court concluded, since state establishment and maintenance of a port "is but an incident of its power
to control its navigable waters,"'13 action on the part of private industry
in this regard did not detract from the government's right to exercise
this function. Clearly, the port authdrity is "an agency of the state ....
-14
RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN ILLINOIS

Beginning in 1874, Illinois has exercised, through systematic legislation,
its functions of improving and supervising the use of Illinois water; state
action was accomplished through the agency of the Department of Public
Wdrks and Buildings.' 5 Port districts, however, are a development of this
,past decad6. Four port districts have thus far been established: The Chicago Regional Port District (1951 ),16 the Waukegan Port District (1955),17
the Joliet Regional Port District (1957),18 and the Tri-City Regional
Port District (1959).19
THE CHICAGO REGIONAL PORT DISTRICT

The Chicago Regional Port District is "a political subdivision, body
politic and municipal corporation," 20 governed and administered by a ninemember board, of which five members are appointed by the Governor
of Illinois and four members by the Mayor of Chicago. 21 The District
has been tested and found constitutional. 22 Its validity was established by
the Illinois Supreme Court in a 1954 opinion which gives an excellent
resume of the proprietary and supervisory powers and duties of the Port
District. 23
11 Port of New York Authority v. J. E. Linde Paper Co., 127 N.Y.S.2d 155, 158, 205
Misc. 110,113 (1953).
12 "Itisnot necessary that the entire community should directly enjoy or participate
in an improvement or enterprise in order to constitute a public use... " Moore v.
Sanford, 151 Mass. 285, 290, 24 N.E.323, 324 (1890).
13 Visina v.Freeman, 252 Minn. 177, 89 N.W.2d 635 (1958).
14

Ibid., at 647.

15 111.
Rev.Stat. (1957) c.19, §§ 8to 106.

10 Ibid., at §§ 152 to 178.

1 Ill.
Rev. Star. c.19 §§ 285 to 317 (Supp.,1959).

17 Ibid., at § 179 to 212.

20 111.
Rev.Star. (1957) c.19, S 154.
21 Ibid., at 163.

18 Ibid., at §§ 251 to 282.
22

People v.Chicago Regional Port District,4111.2d 3.63,
123 NE.2d 92 (1954).
"The District has no power to incur any obligations for salaries and expenses
until authorized by the General Assembly and appropriations are made therefor. ...
Ithas power to acquire and accept by lease, gift or otherwise, any property and rights
23

useful for itspurpose and to aid in the development of adequate channels, ports,
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Several claims of unconstitutionality were examined, necessitating an
analysis of the District.
1. Proprietary powers-The State of Illinois and City of Chicago had
relinquished all rights and interest in the bed of Lake Calumet to the Port
District, so as to enable the District to develop Calumet Harbor. In order
to further facilitate the District's functions, it was given the power to
acquire any navigable waters of the state which were within the District
area. This was claimed to violate the Illinois Constitution of 1870 (separate
section three) which at that time prohibited the sale or lease of any canal
or waterway owned by the state unless such action was first approved by
a majority vote at a general election. The court interpreted this section
as prohibiting the passage of state waters into the control of private
interests. The Port District, as an "alter-ego of the State" 24 and an agency
to improve public transportation, is not such an interest.
2. Municipal in purpose and design-Article IV of Section 22 of the
Illinois Constitution of 1870 prohibits the establishment of corporations
by special law. Noting that special laws have been used to establish municipal corporations such as the Sanitary District of Chicago, the Chicago
Park District and the Chicago Transit Authority, the court concluded
that the constitutional provision applies to only three types of municipal
25
corporations. These are cities, towns, and villages.
In order to determine whether or not the District is a municipal, i.e.,
public corporation, it was necessary to establish whether the proprietary
and administrative powers conferred by Section 156, Chapter 19, Illinois
Revised Statutes (1957) are public powers. Since transportation has been
declared to be a public purpose in Illinois, 26 it follows logically that

powers designed to promote marine transportation are given for a public
purpose.
Further, supervision and control is entrusted, not to private individuals,
harbors or terminals or port facilities ... to apply for and accept federal grants, loans
or appropriations ... to procure and enter into insurance and indemnity contracts ...
to borrow money for port facilities, property and equipment, and to issue revenue
bonds and certificates in payment of same.... The district has no power to levy taxes
for any purpose .... The act provides that it shall be unlawful to make any fill or
deposit of rock, earth, sand or other materials, or build any wharf, pier, etc., over, or
within 40 feet of any navigable waters within said Port District, without a permit
therefor, and provides penalties for the violation of said provision.... ." Ibid., at 367, 96.
24 Ibid., at 370, 97.
25 People v. Chicago Transit Authority, 392 Ii. 77, 64 N.E.2d 4 (1945); Kocsis v.
Chicago Park District, 362 II1.24, 198 N.E. 847 (1935); Sanitary District v. Ray, 199
Ill. 63, 64 N.E. 1048 (1902); Wilson v. Board of Trustees, 133 I11.443, 27 N.E. 203
(1890).
26
People v. Chicago Transit Authority, 392 I11.77, 64 N.E.2d 4 (1945); People v.
Wood, 391111.237,62 N.E.2d 809 (1945).
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but to a board whose members are subject to control by state and city
authorities.27 The District is, in all respects, a municipal, i.e., public
corporation.
Since every municipal corporation exercises monopolistic powers, the
exclusive jurisdictional control exercised by the Port District within its
statutorily defined area is free from constitutional objections from that
28
source.
3. No power of taxation-Section 161 of Chapter 19 of Illinois Revised
Statutes (1957) specifically denies to the district the power of taxation

for any purposes. Indebtedness incurred, evidenced through bonds issued
or otherwise, are to be "payable solely from the revenue or income
derived. . .

."

This method of financing public works-whereby the state,

to the knowledge of the bondholder, assumes no obligation-has been
judicially approved as utilized by the Chicago Transit Authority 29 and
the Illinois State Toll Highway Commission.3"
4. Rules and regulations-Legislative powers are granted by Section
172 in regard to the power to make rules and enforce them through
penalties. The court viewed this as a proper delegation in order that a
body validly created may accomplish its purposes. In the same vein,
money appropriated to the District is necessary so that the Port District
may make improvements acting in its capacity as agent of the state.
The Chicago Regional Port District Act was thereby declared valid
and free of all constitutional objections raised, thus impliedly providing
a firm basis for the development of similar port districts in Illinois. The
universally predicted growth of commerce on the Great Lakes, however, will probably cause conditions calling for the delegation of other
powers in addition to those judicially sanctioned.
POLICE POWER POSSIBILITIES

It is noteworthy that two of the four districts in Illinois, Waukegan
and Tri-City, are each specifically given the power to "exercise polite
27 In regard to the authority of the mayor to appoint a certain number of members to
the Board, and to otherwise act in cooperation with the governor, it was decided that
the delegation of this power was "solely within the discretion of the legislative branch."
The court refused to find any unconstitutional infringement on the powers of the
governor. People v. Chicago Regional Port Dist., 4 M.2d 363, 280, 123 N.E.2d 92, 102

(1954).
28 The power to require special procedure in personal injury actions brought aainst

municipal corporations is also well established. Thus, Section 174 validly requires a
written statement of particulars to be filed within six months after the date that cause
accrued or the injury was received, and that the commencement of the suit be within
one year of such date. Ibid., at 378, 101.
29People v. Chicago Transit Authority, 392 1.77, 64N.E.2d 4 (1945).

a0 People v. Illinois State Toll Highway Commission, 3 11.2d 218, 120 N.E.2d 35
(1954).
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powers in respect [to its property] and to employ and commission police
officers and other qualified persons to enforce [rules and regulations]." 31
It is difficult to tell whether the "police" are thereby rendered officers
of the state for the purpose of making arrests32 or mere watchmen for
the purpose of imposing fines upon those who violate district regulations.
Also doubtful is the ability of the Districts by their own action to
33
declare the violation of a regulation to be a misdemeanor.
The New York Waterfront Commission exemplifies a unique type of
police power which Illinois may well examine in anticipation of a large
waterfront labor force. The Port of New York District is a joint New
York-New Jersey agency.3 4 Necessarily the Waterfront Commission
functioning within this Port is the result of legislation on the part of
both states.3 5 Since its establishment in 1953, the Commission has been
most successful in improving and systematizing conditions of waterfront
labor within the Port of New York District, so as to reduce corruption
once manifested in the public loading racket and defective watchman system.3 6 Violations of provisions of the interstate compact establishing the
Commission are deemed "misdemeanor[s], punishable by a fine of not
more than five hundred dollars ($500.00) or by imprisonment for not
37
more than one year, or both."
The Port of Chicago area (as distinguished from the Chicago Regional
Port District) extending from Chicago Harbor, Illinois to Gary Harbor,
Indiana, for which almost one-half of the traffic is handled in Indiana,38 pre31

M. Rev. Star. (1957) c. 19, S§ 182 (m), 287 (13).
The London Port Authority polices the docks within its jurisdiction with its own
"Police Officers ...who have all the powers of arrest of a Police Officer in the service
of the Crown .... They are appointed and paid by the Authority and have the ranks
equivalent to those in the Police Forces outside." Authority cited, supra note 3, at 6.
33 Cal. Harbor and Navigation Code (Deering Cal. Codes Ann., 1954) S 6302 gives
the Stockton Port District the power to "enact necessary police regulations." Held:
This could not give the port, which the California court considered a "mere quasimunicipal corporation," the power to declare a violation of its ordinance to be a misdemeanor and provide for its punishment as such. Gilgert v. Stockton Port District, 7
Cal.2d 384, 60 P.2d 847 (1936).
34 Created by compact April 13, 1921, authorized by c. 144 of the Laws of New
York (1921) and c. 151 of the Laws of New Jersey (1921).
35 N.Y. Unconsolidated Laws (McKinney, 1957) S 6700aa et seq; N. J. Stat. Ann.
(1957) c. 32, S 23-1 et seq.
36 Consult The Fourth Report of the New York Crime Commission, Williams
Press, Inc. (Albany, 1953), and Annual Reports by Waterfront Commission of New
York Harbor, 1954 to date.
87 N.Y. Unconsolidated Laws (McKinney, 1957) S 6700ss; N.J. Stat. Ann. (1957)
c. 32, S 23-76.
38 For an excellent description of the geography of the Port area and consideration
of its future growth, read: Mayer, The Future of the Port of Chicago, 4 U. of Ill. L.
Forum 1, 3 (Spring 1959).
32
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sents an excellent opportunity for bi-state co-operation both in the commercial and supervisory sense. An interstate port authority, to exercise jurisdiction along the shore line between Waukegan, Illinois, and Michigan City,
Indiana, Was proposed in the Illinois General Assembly in 1957, 39 but failed
to pass. Perhaps the future will see Illinois-Indiana action of the New
York type.
THE TAXING POWER

It was noted earlier that the Chicago Regional Port District is specifically denied the power to tax. Possibly Illinois has through this denial
eliminated some constitutional headaches.
A June, 1959, case 40 demonstrates problems arising when the taxing
power is delegated. The Port of Seattle was authorized to levy a tax in
order to carry out a comprehensive scheme of harbor improvements
which the legislature had adopted in 1957. 41 To determine the validity of
such tax the reasons for its authorization were examined. The legislature
had feared that Seattle was deteriorating as an industrial city and was
prompted to grant to the Port the power to condemn "marginal lands."
"Marginal lands" were defined in such general terms as to be applicable to
all land within the industrial area. The object of such condemnation was
to sell lands acquired to private investors for industrial use. The Washington Supreme Court reasoned the plan was to sell the land for private,
not public use; therefore, a tax levy to finance the plan is not for a public
purpose and is unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION

It is obvious that the port districts of Illinois are mere infants, litigation
wise. The experience of more tested equivalent agencies in other states
is only of questionable guidance value. A state agency must act within
its delegated powers, and in doing so necessarily conform to the constitution of its parent state, as this constitution is interpreted by its own
state court. The value of any decision concerning the rights or duties of
a port district as applied to the port district of any other state must be
gauged by a comparative study of all statutory and case law in both states.
As traffic on the Great Lakes increases the activity in tis area, we can look
to Illinois for more judicial pronouncements on port district powers, both
granted and implied.
39 Legislation passed by Indiana in anticipation of an interstate port authority is
found in Indiana Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1951) c. 68, § 401 to 405.
40 Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 341 P.2d 171 (Wash., 1959).
41 Wash. Laws (1957) c. 265.

